"Essence of Distinction: The Ends, Ways, and Means of China's Military Maritime Quest" - by CWP alum Andrew Erickson
The People's Republic of China (PRC)'s rapid development of military maritime capabilities, and their harnessing under strong personalist paramount leader Xi Jinping to address ambitious national goals, is one of the most important subjects concerning great power security in the international system today. Understanding the key dynamics is thus inherently important. This article surveys Chinese-language publications, U.S. government analyses, and related research, and applies it to a larger framework that addresses both conceptual and empirical issues, considers comparative cases, and offers suggestions for further examination. Its findings are relevant to scholars and practitioners alike: China's military maritime power radiates outward, backstopped by a land-based "anti-Navy." Its Navy focuses on proximate seas-supported by Coast Guard, Maritime Militia, and survey vessel fleets; and extends into distant oceans. China's sea forces and the strategy informing them has become progressively less distinctive with time and distance-trends continuing today. Herein lies one of the greatest strengths, and weaknesses, of Beijing's dramatic military maritime development. China is going to sea dramatically, with tremendous implications for the nation, its neighbors, and the world. Understanding PRC military maritime advances requires understanding their ends, ways, and means. The ends are Beijing's goals, the way is its maritime strategy, and the means are its sea forces. For ends, China has the grandest, most strategic approach of any great power in the international system today. Ambitious paramount leader Xi wants to make China great again at home and abroad; achieving a "world-class military" with a similarly preeminent naval component; and incorporating claimed territories, above all, Taiwan. For ways, China has a maritime strategy. Whether it constitutes part of a universal field of strategic thought, or should it be seen as a distinct intellectual tradition that cannot easily be mapped onto Western history and concepts, depends in part on how generally, or more specifically, one frames the question. I address this overarching comparison of Chinese and some foreign cases at a level of detail sufficient to understand PRC oceanic activities in practice-a level that is useful for scholars, strategists, and practitioners alike.
Front. Polit. Sci. - Sec. Peace and Democracy
Volume 6 - 2024 | doi: 10.3389/fpos.2024.1448241
Dr. Andrew S. Erickson (艾立信) is Professor of Strategy (tenured full professor) in NWC’s China Maritime Studies Institute. A core founding member, he helped establish CMSI and stand it up officially in 2006 and has played an integral role in its development; from 2021–23 he served as Research Director. CMSI inspired the creation of other research centers, which he has advised and supported; he is a China Aerospace Studies Institute Associate. Since 2008 he has been an Associate in Research at Harvard’s Fairbank Center. Erickson has taught courses at NWC and Yonsei University, advises NWC student research and curricula and supports NWC’s scholarly research relations with Japanese counterparts.
Photo Credit: By Original uploader was Nicolau at zh.wikipedia - Originally from zh.wikipedia; description page is/was China Emblem PLA.svg., Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=2531982
