"China’s Use of Force on Taiwan: Impact on PLA Capabilities" - by CWP alum Joel Wuthnow
The US Department of Defense assesses that China has the capability to execute a blockade or punitive missile strike against Taiwan. Why, then, has Beijing thus far not deployed these options?1 Why might China choose not to launch an invasion of the island after 2027—the date by which Xi Jinping has reportedly given the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready?2 Any use of force would entail economic and social risks, but there are also potential military consequences that must be considered. Even scenarios with low impact on PLA capabilities would threaten escalation that Beijing could not control, especially if the United States were to intervene. An invasion could devolve into a quagmire, much as Russia has experienced in Ukraine, and this would threaten not only China’s military security but also the security of the regime. This essay explains the military costs and risks for Chinese decision-makers in using different levels of force against Taiwan. It assesses the impact in three areas: the ability to conduct follow-on missile, blockade, and landing operations against Taiwan; the ability to perform other internal, domestic, and global missions; and the political risks for Party army relations. It does this through a scenario-based analysis. Two of the scenarios are generated by the German Marshall Fund project—a minor conflict in which China and Taiwan engage in a series of deadly air and maritime incidents, and a major war involving massive casualties and a failed invasion. It adds an intermediate scenario in which the PLA launches a
https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/If%20China%20Attacks%20Taiwan.pdf
Dr. Joel Wuthnow is a senior research fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs within the Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU. His research areas include Chinese foreign and security policy, Chinese military affairs, U.S.-China relations, and strategic developments in East Asia. In addition to his duties in INSS, he also serves as an adjunct professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.
His recent books and monographs include China’s Quest for Military Supremacy (Polity, 2025, with Phillip C. Saunders), Sea Dragons: Special Operations and Chinese Military Strategy (Naval War College Press, 2025, with John Chen), Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan (NDU Press, 2022, lead editor), and Gray Dragons: Assessing China's Senior Military Leadership (NDU Press, 2022). His research and commentary has also appeared in outlets such as Asia Policy, Asian Security, China Leadership Monitor, The China Quarterly, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Joint Force Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary China, Journal of Strategic Studies, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Naval War College Review, The New York Times, and in edited volumes.
Photo Credit: https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/If%20China%20Attacks%20Taiwan.pdf
