"Debating China’s Use Of Overseas Ports" - By CWP Alum Isaac Kardon And Wendy Leutert
Isaac Kardon and Wendy Leutert argue that China’s influence in overseas ports is a “consequential form of state power projection” (p. 10) and an “attractive alternative” (p. 43) to overseas bases.1 They compellingly document China’s desire to support peacetime naval operations from People’s Republic of China (PRC)–controlled commercial ports, but they overstate both China’s “privileged access” (p. 10) to these ports and how the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has used them. Rather, we argue that access to foreign ports depends on host-nation permission (which is uncertain), and China has not demonstrated that these ports provide robust fleet support. These factors likely impose significant limits on the PLAN’s ability to project power from PRC-controlled ports.
First, a PRC-controlled port can only support PLAN operations if the host country permits a warship to enter the port; this sovereign authority applies more universally than the authors acknowledge. It is untrue that in peacetime “a [commercial] terminal operator will generally have discretion to grant access for naval vessels seeking to call” (p. 29). Foreign warship entry is a state’s sovereign decision, even in peacetime and even to foreign-controlled ports.2 For example, Sri Lanka recently deferred a visit by a PLA Strategic Support Force vessel to Hambantota—a large and strategically located PRC-controlled port—disrupting the ship’s employment and eliciting complaints from China of “gross interference.”3 The ship docked a week late, only after the Chinese government [End Page 174] intervened politically with the Sri Lankan government.4 The PRC-controlled terminal’s commercial operator did not have discretion to admit this unarmed surveil-lance ship, even in a state over which China has significant influence. PLAN warship visits to PRC-controlled ports in Sri Lanka and elsewhere could face even greater scrutiny by host countries.
The authors further argue that, because of the networked nature of PRC-controlled ports, “neither just one nor several states can sharply limit the power projection capability that PRC firms’ overseas port assets enable” (p. 45). But host nations’ political access decisions could be interrelated. For instance, half of the thirty-two PRC-controlled ports that the authors identify as hosting PLAN visits are located in the United States or in the territories of U.S. allies.5 These host countries are likely to share security concerns about PLAN visits, and the United States may be able to influence host country decision-making.
- David C. Logan , Robert C. Watts IV , Isaac B. Kardon , Wendy Leutert
- International Security
- The MIT Press
- Volume 47, Number 3, Winter 2022-2023
- pp. 174-179
Isaac B. Kardon is a senior fellow for China studies in the Asia Program. He was formerly assistant professor at the U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime Studies Institute, where he researched China’s maritime affairs, and taught naval officers and national security professionals about PRC foreign and security policy.
Leutert is the GLP-Ming Z. Mei Chair of Chinese Economics and Trade. Her research focuses on Chinese political economy, specifically the historical evolution and global expansion of China's state-owned enterprises. Other areas of her research include leadership in China's public sector, China’s early reform and opening, corporate governance in state-owned enterprises, and international investment and trade. Her research is forthcoming or has been published in The China Quarterly, China Perspectives, and Asia Policy. Her commentary has been featured in media outlets including the Financial Times, New York Times, Reuters, Washington Post, and South China Morning Post.
Photo Credit: https://pixabay.com/users/tama66-1032521/
